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The Trade Act of 1974 represented the most signifi-
cant reformulation of United States international economic policy
since the Trade Agreements Act of 1934.1 Responding to criticism
from several quarters, 2 Congress included in the Act major additions
to the laws dealing with unfair foreign trade practices. 3 In particular,
the Act contained several measures intended to expedite the process-
ing of antidumping complaints. One of these measures, the so-called
"fast-track" provision, 4 created a potentially powerful administrative
mechanism to permit the summary dismissal of clearly unmeritori-
ous complaints. Unfortunately, implementation of this amendment
has suffered from a lack of legislative guidance, and it is not at all
clear that the provision has produced significant changes in the ad-
ministration of the antidumping laws. This article will review the
origins of the fast-track provision, and some of the problems asso-
ciated with its administration.
THE NEED FOR A FAST-TRACK PROCEDURE
The primary American antidumping legislation today is the Anti-
dumping Act of 1921. 5 In general terms, the Act provides for the
imposition of special dumping duties equal to the dumping price
margins whenever the Secretary of the Treasury determines that
dumping is taking place. Dumping occurs when sales at less than
fair market value (hereinafter LTFV) cause injury or threat of injury
to domestic industry.
6
Since its inception, the Act has been subject to much criticism.
One of the most frequently cited problems has been the often lengthy
delays in processing antidumping complaints.7 Such delays cause
uncertainty and confusion. In many cases, the sluggish response of
the antidumping procedures denies to American industry the relief to
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which it is entitled under the Act. More often, however, the effect is
quite the opposite. When Treasury withholds appraisement on a ship-
ment of goods, 8 the importer, if he wishes to continue importing, is
required to post a bond in an amount equal to any duties that might
be incurred. 9 This amount is often substantial. If the importer cannot
afford to tie up his funds in such a manner, he may simply cease
importing.10 Even the mere announcement of the initiation of anti-
dumping proceedings can bring about the same result, as the im-
porter will fear being labelled a "dumper" and being subjected to
costly and time-consuming procedures. Thus, even without a final
determination of dumping, imports have been effectively barred. The
antidumping procedures themselves may therefore operate as a pow-
erful protectionist device.11
Much of the delay in antidumping procedures has been attribut-
able to the separation of the injury determination from the LTFV
determination. 12 The inquiry into injury, conducted by the Interna-
tional Trade Commission, does not even begin until Treasury has
issued a preliminary finding of LTFV sales. 13 The fast-track proce-
dure is designed to short-circuit the process by permitting an early
examination of the injury question in cases where there is good rea-
son to doubt that injury can be proved. If, on the basis of the informa-
tion developed in the course of the preliminary investigation of an
antidumping complaint, Treasury concludes
that there is substantial doubt whether an industry in the
United States is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented
from being established, by reason of the importation of mer-
chandise suspected of being sold at LTFV prices into the United
States, he shall forward to the Commission the reasons for such
substantial doubt and a preliminary indication, based on what-
ever price information is available, concerning possible sales at
less than fair value ... If within thirty days after receipt of
such information from the Treasury, the Commission, after con-
ducting such inquiry as it deems appropriate, determines that
there is no reasonable indication that an industry in the United
States is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from
being established, by reason of the importation of such mer-
chandise into the United States, it shall advise the Secretary of
its determination, and any investigation.., then in progress
shall be terminated. 
14
The fast-track provision thus raises the possibility that a com-
plaint may be dismissed without a full-scale investigation. Before
dismissal, however, the complaint must pass through two levels of
administrative decision making: Treasury must determine that
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there is "substantial doubt" that injury is occurring, and the Com-
mission must find "no reasonable indication" of injury. These terms
are not defined, nor do they appear elsewhere in the Act. The legis-
lative history of the provision is also of very little help in giving
precise meaning to this language. 15
ADMINISTRATION OF THE FAST-TRACK PROVISION
On the basis of a finding of "substantial doubt" of injury, Treasury
has invoked the fast-track procedure in twenty-three separate inves-
tigations. These cases represent approximately 10 percent of the to-
tal number of antidumping investigations initiated since the provi-
sion took effect. In seventeen of the cases referred to it under the
fast-track provision, the International Trade Commission concluded
it was unable to say, on the basis of the evidence available, that
there was no reasonable indication of injury.16 Treasury was there-
fore obliged to continue its investigation. The following sections exam-
ine the reasoning the two agencies have followed in making their
respective determinations.
Department of the Treasury
1 7
In concluding that there exists substantial doubt of injury Treasury
has apparently relied heavily upon evidence of market penetration by
the suspected LTFV imports (measured by reference to domestic pro-
duction and domestic sales). In the ten cases in which Treasury cited
low market penetration as a factor in reaching its decision, the mar-
ket shares of the suspect imports were generally less than 5 percent
of either sales or production.18 Although market penetration is usu-
ally considered as only one of several factors, in at least one case an
extremely low level of import penetration was sufficient in itself to
create substantial doubt of injury.' 9 In several other cases, the trend
in market shares has apparently been significant.
20
Treasury has also placed heavy emphasis on utilization of produc-
tive capacity, 2' trends in profitability, 22 and levels of employment in
the affected industry;23 other factors have included evidence of un-
derselling24 and trends in total domestic sales. 25 In at least one case,
Certain Automotive and Motorcycle Repair Manuals from the
United Kingdom,26 the failure of the complainant to supply relevant
data appeared to play a significant role in Treasury's decision. Al-
though evidence of lost sales was provided, the complainant was
unable to provide year-by-year comparisons of earnings, market
shares, volume of imports, or information pertaining to ". . . capital
investment, price suppression, or margins of underselling. '27 On the
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basis of this lack of evidence, plus an indication that the number of
complainant's employees had increased, Treasury found substantial
doubt of injury.
In several cases, Treasury has concluded that while injury to do-
mestic industry exists, there is substantial doubt that such injury re-
sults from LTFV sales. In Carbon Steel Bars and Carbon Steel Strip
from the United Kingdom, 28 Treasury stated that "although...
profitability and employment declined appreciably throughout the do-
mestic industry producing the classes or kinds of merchandise...
there is no evidence before Treasury that those declines were caused
by imports of the alleged sales at less than fair value from the United
Kingdom. '29 In Methyl Alcohol from Canada,30 Treasury found that
the decline in profitability alleged in the complaint was more likely
due to an increase in the cost of production than the impact of LTFV
imports. Finally, in Photographic Color Paper from Japan and West
Germany,3 ' Treasury concluded that a decline in market share "may
have been due in substantial part to factors other than imports.
32 It
continued,
most of the decline in the market share held by the domestic in-
dustry was attributable to Kodak. Some of the decline experienced
by Kodak may have been due to its considerable antitrust prob-
lems. In addition, there is information on record indicating that
GAF's withdrawal from the market was due in large part to com-
petition from Kodak. Finally, the decline in 3M's selling prices
appears to have been a reflection of both its increased efficiency in
the manufacture of this product, which it expressly acknowledges
as having occurred, and price competition from Kodak.33
It is difficult to draw from the cases an easily applicable standard
that might serve as a valid predictive tool. However, some patterns
are evident. Where the domestic market share exceeds 85 to 90 per-
cent, and there is no evidence of a rapid increase in the import mar-
ket share, it is highly likely that fast-track proceedings will be insti-
tuted. This is especially true if the market share of imports from the
particular country named in the complaint is itself less than 5 per-
cent. Furthermore, where the alleged injury appears to accrue only
to a single firm, and the rest of the industry remains substantially
unaffected, Treasury may well conclude that the requisite substan-
tial doubt exists.
34
The International Trade Commission
Despite its experience in making injury determinations, the Commis-
sion was initially unable to agree upon the standards to be applied in
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fast-track cases.35 In fact, two distinct views developed in the early
cases. The majority approach was first stated by Commissioners
Bedell, Parker, and Leonard in Butadiene Acrylonitrile Rubber from
Japan.38 Applying a strict standard of proof, these Commissioners
indicated that they would halt Treasury's investigation only where
the respondent-importers could make a "clear and convincing show-
ing" that there was no reasonable indication of injury.37 Because the
necessary showing could not be made, the Commission returned the
case to Treasury. In the next case to come before it, the Commission
again applied this strict standard. 38 Commissioner Minchew quar-
reled with the majority's position on the grounds that requiring such
a high standard of proof would render the fast-track provision useless
as a means of reducing the burdens of an antidumping investigation.
He would have required the domestic petitioners to carry the burden
of proving that there was some possibility of injury and that the
investigation should for that reason go forward. 39 The majority ap-
proach could make it impossible ever to terminate an investigation
by means of the fast-track procedure except where the claim of in-
jury was so patently frivolous that one could imagine no possible
basis for a finding of injury. And in the first three fast-track cases to
come before it, the Commission did indeed refuse to terminate the
investigation. Although the Commission has not explicitly relaxed
the standard it is applying, it has shown its willingness in more re-
cent cases to make a finding of no reasonable indication of injury
and dismiss the complaint where not all of the evidence points to this
conclusion.
40
In substantive terms, the Commission has generally considered the
same indicators as are noted in Treasury's determinations, although
in much greater detail.4 1 Thus market penetration by LTFV imports
has been of major significance, as, for example, in Multi-Metal
Lithographic Plates from Mexico,42 where the Commission unani-
mously found no reasonable indication of injury where import mar-
ket penetration was only 3 percent and other indicators did not sup-
port the complainant's allegations.
43
The Commission has also been forced to wrestle with the problem
of defining the relevant industry. In most cases, the products have
been fungible, imports have been distributed on a national basis,
and the firms affected by the imports have been easily identifi-
able. 44 However, in Portland Hydraulic Cement from Mexico, 45 the
Commission found a reasonable indication of injury to industry in a
limited geographical area, where transportation costs for the im-
ported goods were high and consequently all of the imports were
sold in the area immediately surrounding the port of entry. Simi-
larly, in Perchloroethylene from Belgium, France, and Italy,46 the
Commission recognized that almost all of the imports in question
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entered through northeastern ports and were sold within a two hun-
dred-mile radius. While domestic producers' shipments nationally
had fallen only 9 percent over the three years prior to the filing of
the complaint, their shipments into the Northeast had declined 34
percent during that period. Thus the Commission appears willing to
examine injury on a regional basis where the market structure indi-
cates it is appropriate.
The fast-track provision requires that there be some causal link
between injury and the LTFV imports. Direct evidence of causation
is difficult to find, except for those cases in which it can be estab-
lished that purchasers shifted from domestic goods to imported goods
because of the latter's lower prices. 47 Although this sort of evidence
is at least mentioned in many of the fast-track determinations, in
virtually none has it been the determinative factor. In most cases,
the Commission appears to have concluded that the simultaneous
occurrence of LTFV sales and injury is in itself sufficient to show a
causal link, absent strong evidence that such injury results from
factors unrelated to imports.
Because of the complex and varied nature of the factual circum-
stances, it is difficult to generalize from the cases to date. Yet it is
clear that the Commission will ordinarily favor continuing the Trea-
sury investigation if the amount of injury seems at all significant,
and there is evidence of a causal link, if only that injury and LTFV
sales occurred within the same general time frame. Furthermore, it
must be noted that the Commission is likely to insist that Treasury
investigation continue when it believes that the information avail-
able is incomplete.
In several instances, the fast-track procedure has allowed Treasury
to avoid what otherwise would have been a long and costly investiga-
tion. Yet Treasury and the Commission have used the provision spar-
ingly and conservatively. With only six investigations dismissed, out
of the almost one hundred initiated since the fast-track procedure
became available, one must conclude that the new procedure has so
far had only a minimal effect on the administration of the Antidump-
ing Act. The time saved by the use of the procedure may well have
been outweighed by the added burden for the Commission of a new
administrative proceeding.
The caution displayed by both agencies in administering the provi-
sion appears to stem more from uncertainty about what standards to
apply than from any policy favoring longer investigations. As anti-
dumping proceedings become more common, a clearer set of stan-
dards may well emerge. Congress could certainly facilitate this
development by providing more explicit guidelines for the adminis-
tration of the provision.
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NOTES
1. Ch. 474, § 1, 48 Stat. 943
(1934).
2. The literature on the response
to unfair foreign trade prac-
tices is extensive. For a collec-
tion of views on the situation
before the enactment of the
Trade Act of 1974, see
COMISSION ON INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE AND INVEST-
MENT POLICY, UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL EcoNonc
POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT
WORLD: PAPERS I 139-535
(1971). More extensive discus-
sion of antidumping policy in
particular can be found in Cou-
dert, The Application of
United States Antidumping
Law in the Light of a Liberal
Trade Policy, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 189 (1965), and
Schwartz, The Administration
by the Department of the
Treasury of the Laws Author-
izing the Imposition of Anti-
dumping Duties, 14 VA. J.
INT'L L. 463 (1974).
3. Title III of the Trade Act of
1974, Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat.
2041 (1975), contains sections
dealing with foreign import re-
strictions (§§ 301-02, 19
U.S.C. § 1202 (1976)); anti-
dumping duties (§ 321, 19
U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (1976));
countervailing duties (§ 331,
19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976)); and
unfair trade practices (§ 341,
19 U.S.C. § 156 (1976)).
4. Section 201(c)(2) of the Anti-
dumping Act of 1921, as
amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(2)
(1976). For an early analysis of
the provision by two members
of the International Trade Com-
mission staff, see McDermid &
Foster, The U.S. International
Trade Commission's 30-Day In-
quiry Under the Antidumping
Act: Section 201(c)(2), 27
MERCER L. REV. 657 (1976).
5. Ch. 14, tit. II, 42 Stat. 11
(1921), as amended, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 160-73 (1976).
6. Under the procedural frame-
work created by the Act, a
dumping finding is a two-step
process: upon receipt of infor-
mation giving rise to a suspi-
cion of dumping (usually in the
form of a complaint by a do-
mestic producer), Treasury ini-
tiates an investigation to deter-
mine if LTFV sales are in fact
occurring. If this investigation
reaches an affirmative conclu-
sion, the International Trade
Commission is notified; they in
turn decide whether those
sales are causing (or are likely
to cause) injury to domestic in-
dustry. If injury is found, the
Secretary of the Treasury is re-
quired to impose a duty equal
to the adjusted difference be-
tween the import price and the
fair value in the exporting
country. Although the Act re-
quires the Commission to com-
plete its investigation within
thirty days (19 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1976)), it placed no time lim-
its on the LTFV determination,
or on the assessment of duties
once a dumping finding had
been made.
7. See Coudert, supra note 2, at




and Antidumping Duties, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 44, 60 (1958).
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8. Withholding of appraisement
takes place after the Secretary
of the Treasury makes a pre-
liminary determination that
dumping is occurring or is
likely to occur (19 U.S.C. §
160(b) (1976)). The 1974 Act
requires that this preliminary
determination be made within
six months of the initiation of
antidumping proceedings.
9. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.50-53
(1977).
10. This assumes, of course, that
the importer is unwilling to
raise his prices.
11. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAW OF GATT 47
(1969). A detailed analysis of




Act: Protectionism or Unfair-
Competition Law?, 41 WASH.
L. REv. 315 (1966).
12. The United States practice of
separate LTFV and injury in-
vestigations has been criticized
as a violation of the United
States international obligations
under the International Anti-
dumping Code (Agreement on
the Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, GATT
Doc L/12812 (July 12, 1967),
T.I.A.S. No. 6431), which re-
quires that those determina-
tions be made simultaneously.
Although the 1974 Trade Act
did not formally modify this
segregation, it may be argued
that, in practical effect, the
new fast-track proceedings
have brought the United States
into conformity with the Code.
It would be difficult to imagine
how an injury investigation
would proceed without some
indication of the nature and
extent of LTFV sales; yet the
fast-track provision allows con-
sideration of injury after only
thirty days of preliminary in-
vestigation by Treasury. Once
the fast-track procedure is ini-
tiated, the investigations do be-
come simultaneous since Trea-
sury's investigation proceeds
concurrently. The real question
is whether the Commission's
determination of "no reason-
able indication," see text at
notes 35-47, constitutes an ex-
amination of the injury ques-
tion. This issue must be re-
solved by reference to the
Code's requirements for find-
ing injury to industry; at the
very least, it seems that the
fast-track provision provides
the United States with a color-
able claim to conformity with
the Code.
13. The original Act gave Treasury
authority to conduct both the
LTFV and the injury determi-
nations, but a 1954 amend-
ment (ch. 1213, tit. III, § 301,
68 Stat. 1138 (1954)) turned
that function over to the Tariff
Commission (now the Interna-
tional Trade Commission).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(2) (1976).
15. The relevant portions of the
Senate report merely indicate in
general terms that the purpose
of the provision was to reduce
the "administrative burden and
impediment to trade" of unnec-
essary investigations. See S.
REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 170 (1974).
16. The Commission has used var-
ious phrases in announcing
their decisions in fast-track
proceedings, including "a
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negative determination" of "no
reasonable indication" of in-
jury, and a "reasonable indica-
tion" of injury. Their difficulty
in establishing a useful phras-
ing is perhaps indicative of the
ambiguity of the statutory
language.
17. The fast-track provision re-
quires Treasury to inform the
Commission of its reasons for
"substantial doubt" (19 U.S.C.
§ 160(c)(2) (1976)). These rea-
sons are contained in the for-
warding letter accompanying
Treasury's preliminary infor-
mation at the commencement
of the fast-track inquiry and
are summarized in the notices
of the initiation of fast-track
proceedings published in the
Federal Register. Forwarding
letters for the first seven fast-
track inquiries (AA1921-Inq.-1
through AA1921-Inq.-7) are
available for public inspection
at the Commission offices;
those for subsequent cases are
contained in the appendices to
the relevant USITC reports.
18. See Butadiene Acrylonitrile
Rubber from Japan, 40 Fed.
Reg. 13,532 (1975) (imports ac-
counted for less than one per-
cent of domestic consumption);
Portland Hydraulic Cement
from Mexico, 40 Fed. Reg.
54,267 (1975) (imports declined
from 3.5 percent to 2.5 percent
of total market); Multimetal
Lithographic Plates from Mex-
ico, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,581 (1976)
(imports were 0.14 percent of
market); Monosodium Gluta-
mate from Korea, 40 Fed. Reg.
19,990 (1975) (3.6 percent of do-
mestic market); Methyl Alcohol
from Brazil, 42 Fed. Reg.
46,626 (1977) (contract for the
delivery of a quantity of alcohol
representing 0.6 percent of
United States sales and 0.2 per-
cent of United States produc-
tion); Carbon Steel Bars and
Carbon Steel Strip from the
United Kingdom, AA1921-
Inq.-8, -9, USITC Publ. 855
(1978) (imports of bars ac-
counted for 1.4 percent of
United States consumption;
those of strip for 0.2 percent);
Uncoated Free Sheet Offset
Paper from Canada, AA1921-
Inq.-10 (1978) (import market
share in three years prior to fil-
ing of complaint ranged from




912 (1978) (imports from Hun-
gary never exceeded 5 percent
of domestic market); Sugar
from Belgium, France, and
West Germany, AA1921-Inq.-
20, -21, -22, USITC Publ. 916
(1978) (imports constituted 1.0
percent of United States pro-
duction and 0.5 percent of
sales); Titantium Dioxide from
Belgium, France, and West
Germany, AA1921-Inq.-23,
USITC Publ. 930 (1978) (im-
port market share increased
from 4.1 percent to 10.2 per-
cent over the four years prior to
the complaint).
19. Multimetal Lithographic
Plates, supra note 18.
20. See, e.g., Portland Hydraulic
Cement, supra note 18 (mar-
ket share decline of 1 percent
in the year preceding com-
plaint); see also Monosodium
Glutamate, supra note 18 (de-
cline of 3.1 percent).
21. See, e.g., Butadiene Acryloni-
trile Rubber, supra note 18,
(United States industry at 95
percent capacity utilization);
Titanium Dioxide, supra note
18 (capacity utilization stable
and expected to rise).
22. See, e.g., Uncoated Free Sheet
Offset Paper, supra note 18
(profitability paralleling mar-
ket demand).
23. See Carbon Steel Bars, supra
note 18, (profitability and em-
ployment declined).
24. See Stainless Steel Round Wire
from Japan, AA1921-Inq.-17,
USITC Publ. 907 (1978).
25. Id. (sales increasing); see also
Photographic Color Paper from
Japan and West Germany,
AA1921-Inq.-11, -12, USITC
Publ. 885 (1978) (domestic con-
sumption increasing).
26. AA1921-Inq.-19, USITC Publ.
913 (1978).
27. Id. at A-30.
28. AA1921-Inq.-8-9, USITC
Publ. 855 (1978).
29. Id. at A-80.
30. AA1921-Inq.-13, USITC Publ.
898 (1978).
31. Supra note 26.
32. Id. at A-27.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Photographic Color
Paper, supra note 26, where
the decline in industry market
share was found to be due to
the decline in one manufac-
turer's share.
35. Since 1954, the Commission
has been charged with the re-
sponsibility for conducting the
full injury investigation after a
finding of LTFV sales (see note
13 supra). The development of
the standards used in these de-
terminations is reviewed in
Krauland, The Standard of In-
jury in the Resolution of Anti-
dumping Disputes, post.
36. AA1921-Inq.-1, USITC Publ.
727 (1975).
37. Id. at 5.
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38. New, On-the-Highway, Four-
Wheeled, Passenger Automo-
biles from Belgium, France,
Italy, Japan, Sweden, United
Kingdom, and West Germany,
AA1921-Inq.-2, USITC Publ.
739 (1975).
39. Id. at 34.
40. See, e.g., Uncoated Free Sheet
Offset Paper, supra note 18,
where one Commissioner was
unable to find "no reasonable
indication" of injury, while the
majority voted to dismiss the
complaint.
41. Import market penetration, ca-
pacity utilization, lost sales,
price suppression, levels of pro-
duction and employment,
trends in inventories and for-
eign capacity to produce for ex-
port. See Titanium Dioxide, su-
pra note 18, at 11.
42. AA1921-Inq.-4, USITC Publ.
775 (1976).
43. The Commission noted that
"minimal import penetration
by itself is not sufficient to
conclude that there is no rea-
sonable indication of injury or
likelihood thereof. Other indi-
cators... must be examined."
Id. at 5.
44. This has been true in approxi-
mately three-fourths of the
cases.
45. AA1921-Inq.-3, USITC Publ.
751 (1978).
46. AA1921-Inq.-14, -15, -16,
USITC Publ. 904 (1978).
47. See, e.g., Standard Household
Incandescent Lamps, supra
note 18, (majority failed to find
significant evidence of alleged
lost sales); Methyl Alcohol
from Canada, supra note 30
("the Commission's investiga-
tion indicates that a significant
volume of sales may have been
lost to Canadian imports.")
